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If knowledge is fundamental to globalisation, globalisation should also
have a profound impact on the transmission of knowledge.
(Carnoy and Rhoten, 2002)
Globalisation itself is neither good nor bad. It has the power to do enormous
good.… But in much of the world it has not brought comparable benefits. For
many, it seems closer to an unmitigated disaster.
(Stiglitz, 2002)
Globalisation, by increasing the interdependence among the people of the
world, has enhanced the need for global collective action and the importance
of public goods.
(Stiglitz, 2002)
The foremost task of democratic politicians on the threshold of the next
century will be to restore the state and the primacy of politics over economics.
If this is not done, the dramatic fusing together of humanity through technol-
ogy and trade will soon turn into the opposite and lead to global crack-up.
(Martin and Schumann, 1996)
1
Introduction
Comparative education has traditionally meant the study of national education
systems. The field first developed in the early nineteenth century in parallel with
the rise of national education, and it took the national system as its main object
of enquiry (Noah and Eckstein, 1969). The twentieth-century comparativists
who consolidated it as an academic subject, including Michael Sadler, Isaac
Kandel and Nicholas Hans, continued to focus on the classification and expla-
nation of characteristics of different national systems. But how far is this
approach valid today? Doesn’t the ‘decline’ of the nation state make national
systems obsolete? And isn’t the very idea of a ‘system’ anachronistic in a world of
market triumphalism and global disorganisation? As Peter Jarvis asks in a recent
edition of Comparative Education: ‘Why should we undertake comparative
analysis at all in this Global Village?’(Jarvis, 2000: 353).
These are tough questions for comparative educationalists because the con-
cept of the national education system forms the keystone of the whole mental
architecture of comparative education. It may be hard to think comparative
without it. Nevertheless, the question has been rightly posed and needs answer-
ing. The purpose of my lecture is to explore how globalisation is changing edu-
cation and the implication of this for comparative study. Why study education
systems and why study national education systems in particular? What else
should comparativists study, and how? What defines the field of comparative
education? I approach these questions first historically and secondly method-
ologically.
The parallel rise of comparative education and national
education systems
Writing about education in foreign countries has a long history, going back in
fact to antiquity. Xenephon described the training of Persian youth for citizen-
ship, comparing the aims and structures of Persian and Greek education; Julius
Caesar, in his De Bello Gallico (book vi), commented on the educational aims
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and procedures of the Druids and attempted some general explanations; and
Marco Polo wrote about education in China. In the early modern era, well-
travelled literati from Europe frequently wrote about their observations of
education in other European countries and even in Asia, just as Asian writers
commented on their experiences in Europe For the most part these were un-
systematic travellers’ tales, what Noah and Eckstein refer to as a superior kind of
journalism (Noah and Eckstein, 1969).
This tradition continued in the nineteenth century with the reports on for-
eign education by Europeans such as Victor Cousin, James Kay-Shuttleworth
and Matthew Arnold, and by American educationalists such as Horace Mann,
Orville Taylor and John Griscom. In a sense these were still travellers’ tales but
they had assumed a new form. They were somewhat more systematic at descrip-
tion and classification, although often still highly subjective; they also now
played a significant political role, in the sense of being used for policy purposes.
Reports on foreign education systems were used as an early and weak form of
‘evidence-based policy making’: they sought foreign examples of policies and
practices to borrow, and empirical data on the effects of foreign policies and
practices as evidential support for policies advocated at home. They were also
conscious of the fact that they were studying a new educational phenomenon –
the national education system. Marc-Antoine Jullien, often considered the
founder of comparative education, set out in his 1817 text, Esquisse et vues
préliminaries d’un ouvrage sur l’education comparée, to provide some systematic
comparative classification of education systems, based on rudimentary ques-
tionnaire surveys.
Comparative education, in its nascent form as a ‘discipline’ or, as some prefer,
a ‘sub-disciplinary field of application’ (usually of comparative social science),
began with the notions of national systems because they were the emergent con-
temporary reality – the important things to understand. The national education
systems which arose in northern Europe and the northern USA from the late
eighteenth century were sui generis: radically different from the artisanal and
clerical forms of learning that went before. As Margaret Archer described them
in her classic book, The Origins of Education Systems (1979), they were systems
of formal schooling at least partly funded and supervised by the state, providing
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a putative monopoly of education to all school-age children in a given nation;
and whose different levels became increasingly systemically co-ordinated and
integrated over time.
These systems began with the national networks of elementary schools that
were developed with state financial and legal assistance into a universal phe-
nomenon. Post-elementary secondary and technical schooling subsequently
expanded from its tiny elite base, to allow a small trickle of upward mobility and
give credibility to the Napoleonic maxim of ‘the career open to talents’. Except
in the American North and West, the secondary schools represented a parallel
system separate from the mass elementary school system until considerably
later, but gradually institutions did became more articulated with one another,
and systems emerged which were increasingly regulated by the state. As public
schools came to predominate over private and voluntary institutions, govern-
ments increased their control over systems, providing the majority of funds,
licensing and inspecting schools and teachers, organising teacher training
through growing networks of dedicated Normal schools and, in most cases,
overseeing national certification and standard school curricula. These were def-
initely systems in formation, and they had increasingly central functions within
society.
They were also distinctly national, both in the sense of being state-driven and
in the sense of meeting needs defined in national terms. National education sys-
tems developed, as I argued in Education and State Formation (Green, 1990), as
part of the long process of state formation that stretched in a great arch from
the late absolutist states, through the French Revolution and beyond to the grad-
ual construction of democratic nation states in the nineteenth century. Through
these national education systems states fashioned disciplined workers and loyal
military recruits; created and celebrated national languages and literatures; pop-
ularised national histories and myths of origin, disseminated national laws, cus-
toms and social mores, and generally explained the ways of the state to the
people and the duties of the people to the state. National education was a mas-
sive engine of integration, assimilating the local to the national and the partic-
ular to the general. In short, it created, or tried to create, the civic identity and
national consciousness which would bind each to the state and reconcile each to
4
Andy Green
the other, making actual citizens out of those who were deemed such in law by
virtue of their birth or voluntary adoption.
It is no surprise then that the first comparative educationalists were preoccu-
pied with systems and with nationhood. They organised their classifications of
education around national systems; they collected data at the national level
where they could; and they sought national characteristics to explain variations
between systems. They reckoned, rightly, that the state was a major force in fash-
ioning education systems, and therefore analysed national political forms, as
well as other national factors such as language, climate and religion, to under-
stand differences between systems.
Jullien was the first to try to classify the characteristics of different national
systems, focussing on institutional forms and processes (Jullien, 1817). Emile
Levasseur, a French statistician later in the century, made more systematic quan-
titative comparative comparisons using data on enrolments (Levasseur, 1897).
He also sought to explain variations in country systems with reference to reli-
gion, race, climate, and levels of democracy. He found, for instance, as the his-
torian Carlo Cipolla was later to confirm, that protestant northern European
nations typically had higher enrolments than southern Catholic nations
(Cipolla, 1969). There was some occasional interest in within-system differ-
ences. Joseph Kay, another educational traveller, noted, like Jullien before him,
that comparison across regions within states might be fruitful, particularly
where there were interesting sets of variations as between cantons in Switzerland
(Noah and Eckstein, 1969). However, it was mainly cross-national study of sys-
tems that preoccupied these early comparativists.
The major comparative scholars of the first half of the twentieth century, from
Sadler down to Kandel and Hans, were equally concerned with characterising
and explaining national systems, although they did this more rigorously and
with more concern for the complexities of causation than their forebears. Sadler
was famously concerned with the social contexts external to institutions. He
believed, contrary to modern orthodoxies about ‘school effects’, that these were
more important than internal institutional dynamics to the understanding of
how the education process worked in each country. Kandel also explored the
cultural and historical ‘forces and factors’ behind system variation, including
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the roles of State and Church, and the effects of class, race, and social and eco-
nomic organisation.
Both viewed education through the lens of the nation state. According to
Sadler: ‘All good and live education is an expression of national life and charac-
ter. It is rooted in the history of the nation and fitted to its needs.’ (quoted in
Noah and Eckstein, 1969: 41). Kandel, likewise, argued in the preface to his
major work, Comparative Education, that his work was ‘based on the point of
view that education systems are dominated by national ends, and that it is the
duty of educators and teachers to understand the meaning of nationalism and
all the forces that contribute to it’ (Kandel, 1933: xxiv). Kandel was a liberal
internationalist and aware that nationalism could take what he called a ‘sinister’
direction, although given that he wrote in the 1930s he was perhaps less alert to
the imminent dangers than he might have been. However, his approach was
imbued with a nation-state perspective. There is little discussion in his works of
national minorities or intra-state cultural differences. Although he notes ‘that
there is considerable danger in employing such a generalization as national char-
acter’ (1933: 23), he didn’t, for all his scholarship, entirely escape the trap.
These early pioneers treated national cultures and institutions from an his-
torical vantage point, stressing long-range patterns and continuities and what
institutional economists now call ‘path dependency’. Arguably they veered
towards a kind of national cultural determinism and they were perhaps rather
less attuned to historical discontinuities and structural divisions of class and
ethnicity than they might have been had their scholarship extended more to the
works of the founding fathers of sociology. However, when their historical
humanist legacy was superseded in the 1960s with a more social scientific
approach this was, on the one hand, through the new scientism of Noah and
Eckstein (1969) and, on the other, through the pragmatic problem-solving
approach of Brian Holmes (1965). These indeed pulled comparative education
closer to social science, although somewhat at the expense of historical depth, as
Andreas Kazemias has noted (2001). However, much of the new comparative
education remained narrowly empirical – either positivist or policy-reform
oriented – and still adrift from much of the more theoretically nuanced work in
other comparative social science disciplines.
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Perspectives also remained largely national. The national system remained the
main unit of comparison, although the focus now was as much on outcomes as
causes. Increasingly, as governments became more obsessed with measuring
national performance, and as the IEA and other bodies obliged with major inter-
national surveys of achievement, comparative education was drawn into a kind
of cross-national Olympics – ranking education systems in terms of their effec-
tiveness. Countless monographs from the OECD, CEDEFOP and other bodies
also focused on the description and classification of national systems.
Apparently, the more internationalised education research became, the more it
focused on comparing national systems.
So what happened in the remaining decades of the last century to cause us to
ask whether education systems may now be in decline and cross-national analy-
sis obsolete? The brief answer is globalisation.
Globalisation and its myths
Globalisation can be defined as the rapid acceleration of cross-border move-
ments of capital, goods, labour, services and information – a process that has
intensified since the 1970s as a result of three major factors: cheap energy and
transportation; the growth of information and communications technologies;
and the impact of the financial and trade liberalisation. The latter began with
the post-Bretton Woods flotation of exchange rates and gathered pace with the
rise of neo-liberal politics under Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. All
three factors lay behind the rapid increases in Foreign Direct Investment and
multinational enterprise that became the hallmark of the current phase of glob-
alisation. What was decisively new about the process was not only the sheer scale
of financial movements (with capital markets moving over one trillion dollars
on a normal day – Thurow, 1996) and the colossal market domination of multi-
national corporations (responsible for some 53 per cent of world value-creation
(much of channelled through untaxable off-shore accounts, see Beck, 2000).
It was also its extension beyond capital, goods and labour, to services, knowl-
edge and culture. Globalisation is not purely a matter of economics. Equally
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important, though more complex, are the effects of globalisation on politics and
culture.
Internationalisation, as Hirst and Thomson remind us (1996), is by no means
a new phenomenon. International trade has a long history and movements of
capital and people reached high levels even before the First World War (in terms
of capital movements not reached again until the 1970s and in terms of people
movements still not surpassed). However, the recent surge of globalisation is
both quantitatively and qualitatively distinct. So much is agreed in current
debates about globalisation. What is not agreed is how far these economic trends
will converge around a single world economic model and how far they will
change the political and cultural landscape. Does globalisation mean the end of
the nation state as the main unit of political and social organisation? Does it
mean the end of cultural differences and the creation of a MacWorld of homo-
geneous cultural space? So far social and political science has found little agree-
ment.
Some useful distinctions can be made, however. As Ulrich Beck notes (2000),
globalisation – an objective, empirically-verifiable process – is different from
‘globalism’, a political ideology which advocates the transformation of the world
along neo-liberal market lines. It is the latter which is responsible for the major
myths that surround contemporary debates on the issue: that the globalisation
process is linear, universal and inevitable; that it necessarily leads to the demise
of national politics and cultures; and that it is invariably a ‘good thing’.
Globalisation is hardly a seamless phenomenon. In fact it is characterised
above all, like capitalism generally, by uneven development, both spatially and
temporally. Although its impacts are felt elsewhere in the world, it is fundamen-
tally about transformations in just three regions of the world: North America,
Europe and Asia, and even within these changes are uneven. We can, after all, see
quite diverse models of capitalism developing, even under the global sway of the
market model, from the so-called ‘bandit capitalism’ of post-Soviet Russia, to
the new and distinctive forms of capitalism in the state-developmentalist East
Asian countries and in mainland China (Albert, 1993; Brown, Green and
Lauder, 2001; Castells, 1997; Dore, 2000; Hutton, 1995; Thurow, 1993). The
global economy is not wholly convergent and nor does it change in an uninter-
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rupted and linear fashion. As Harold James reminds us in his recent book on
The End of Globalisation (James, 2001), the last major historical surge of inter-
nationalisation, in the half century prior to the First World War, led to the 1929
Wall Street Crash and the subsequent world slump. Unfettered market tri-
umphalism was the ideology of that previous era of globalisation and, as the
great historian of Liberalism, Karl Polanyi, argued (1957), this played no small
part in the final collapse of European Liberalism and the subsequent slide into
a second world war. It was national capitalism, not globalisation, that predomi-
nated subsequently during the three decades of miraculous economic growth
that followed reconstruction and pre-dated our current era. Clearly globalisa-
tion is a not a one-way, or a one-speed, historical street.
The inevitabilist vision of the hyper-globalists and free market ideologues is
profoundly ahistorical and undialectical, just as was the progressivist market
triumphalism of their nineteenth-century liberal forerunners, and probably just
as dangerous. It is also prone to the same kinds of economic determinism. The
arguments of Ken’ichi Ohmae (Ohmae, 1990) and company that economic
globalisation will lead to a borderless world – a world without frontiers, and
beyond national politics and national culture – is largely fantasy.
Eric Hobsbawm may have been right to argue, famously, in 1980 that ‘the
nation state is no longer the primary vector of historical development’
(Hobsbawm, 1990), but since he wrote that nation states have been proliferat-
ing at an unprecedented rate, not least with the collapse of the former commu-
nist regimes. There were eighteen new states in the first half of the 1990s alone
(Smith, 1996). At the same time, for many countries, including those advocat-
ing a ‘fortress Europe’, borders become more, not less important. Nation states
may not be capable at present of playing the broadly progressive role they played
in two great eras of state formation following the French Revolution and the
Second World War, and they may be increasingly forced to share their sover-
eignty. But they are clearly not about to disappear and for one very obvious rea-
son. Despite the proliferation of supra-national political organisations and the
tentative emergence of what Beck calls ‘transnational civil society’ (Beck, 2000),
there are still as yet no transnational political entities of sufficient democratic
legitimacy or effectiveness to reduce the need and desire for national states as
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the primary units of societal organisation and political loyalty (Green, 1997). If
the nation state had given way to effective supra-national governance we might
not now be facing a reckless and self-interested US-led war against Iraq.
Nor is the world becoming culturally homogenised except at a very superficial
level. It is true that the reach of global media is extending, and that people’s aspi-
rations are increasingly shaped by images and goods deriving from distant cul-
tures; arguably this was a major factor in the final collapse of the Soviet State
(Hobsbawn, 1994). It is also true that the transnational companies like Coca-
Cola and Nike do, as Naomi Klein argues (2001), seek to create global brand
images and that this fosters a common global idiom. There is increasingly a
global consumer culture. However, this again is not an uncontradictory process.
Global brands are domesticated and adapted (Italian children renaming
Disney’s Mickey Mouse Topolino – Beck, 2000); anti-globalisation protestors in
Canada use ‘culture-jamming’ to subvert the images of the brand advertisers
and reclaim local cultural space. A much more accurate metaphor for cultural
change than homogenisation is the notion of ‘glocalization’ developed by cul-
tural analyst, Roland Robertson (1995). Time/space compression often means
the hybridisation and pluralisation of cultures – dominant cultural forms
mutated by receiving cultures, mixing with local cultures which globalisation
make ever more globally visible. A global mélange: Thai boxing by Moroccan
girls in Amsterdam; Asian rap in London, Irish Bagels and Chinese Tacos.
The third great myth of the globalists is, of course, that globalisation is an
unmitigated good. In one sense globalisation is neither good nor bad: it all
depends, as Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz (2002) argues, on how it is managed.
But the way the world is managing it currently – or rather the way the dominant
powers are not managing it – is clearly bringing enormous material benefits
only to some, while subjecting us all to enormous dangers in terms of environ-
mental devastation, political instability, cultural conflict and social fragmenta-
tion.
That the material benefits of globalisation are spread unevenly is pretty clear.
Whilst material standards rise ever higher in the heartlands of globalisation –
including the East Asian Newly Industrialized Countries, which have been major
beneficiaries of the process – poverty is mounting inexorably in several conti-
10
Andy Green
nents in the world – adding over 100 million to the world’s poor in the 1990s
alone (Stiglitz, 2002: 5). Inequality increases not only within most states, but
also, and more dramatically, globally. According to one estimate, while the
wealthiest 20 per cent of world population were three times richer than the
poorest 20 per cent in the mid-nineteenth century, the ratio is now a staggering
86 to 1 (Martin and Schumann, 1996). This is not, of course, attributable to
globalisation per se. The poorest populations are generally living in those 100 or
so countries that have barely begun to integrate with the global economy. As the
saying goes: there is only one thing worse than being exploited by a multina-
tional and that is not being exploited by one. However, it does have everything
to do with the uneven development of globalisation in its current unregulated,
market-driven form.
Powerful western states, most of whose economies originally grew under pro-
tectionist regimes, maintain their subsidies on agriculture, progressively impov-
erishing the agriculture-dependent states, whilst preaching ‘free trade’ to
everyone else where it suits them. The global enforcers of ‘free-market’ globali-
sation and the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’, the WTO, IMF and the World
Bank, serve the interests of the powerful states and corporations, first and fore-
most. WTO trade agreements reflect mainly rich-country interests in intellectu-
al property rights and open markets in manufactures and services; IMF loans
are designed primarily to ensure debt repayment to rich-country creditors; and
‘one-size-fits-all’ World Bank structural adjustments programmes involve
unnecessary fiscal austerity and over-hasty liberalisation of finance and trade
that are administered to weaker countries for whom they do more harm than
good, whilst benefiting investors in richer countries with wider market access
(Stiglitz, 2002). The uneven benefits of unregulated globalisation arise
inevitably from the unequal terms of engagement which some poorer, less
organised societies – lacking the strong states of the East Asian winners – face in
their encounters with the global market. The old historical adage about free
markets favouring the strong still applies (Hobsbawm, 1969).
Political and social instability is another present danger of globalisation. Part
of this instability arises from the globalisation of finance, as we saw in the Asian
financial crisis. The volatility of these markets is extreme – removed from
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rational judgements about economic fundamentals they are now driven by the
crowd psychology of mass investors and the speculative instincts of the profes-
sional players whose success depends on anticipating what other will do. As
George Soros has said (Soros, 1998) – and he should know– world financial
markets are one step from total chaos, and while the virtual global money dance
goes on, untold disorder and disruption results in countries (like Korea) which
suddenly fall out of favour with the global investors.
Instability arises from another source also. One of the deep ironies of the glob-
al age is that just as the nation state is weakened as an historical force, recrude-
scent nationalisms and religious fundamentalisms are proliferating. The new
nationalisms are not the ‘historically progressive’ liberal sort of the classic early
nineteenth-century age of state formation, where most new states were multi-
national, and where national identity was usually by notions of political belong-
ing and civic responsibility. More often they are ethno-cultural and religious
movements finding expression in xenophobia, racism and violence. Cultural
domination and global inequality ferment defensive reactions within disrupted
communities, and particularly those which equate global culture with American
hegemony. These communities fight back through re-affirmation of traditional
identities and beliefs. Horsman and Marshall (1994) talk – not lightly, I think –
about the revival of tribalism across the world.
This brings me to my last danger. Globalisation inevitably disorganises social
structures and dislocates communities. It has an irrepressible energy to invent
and re-structure. It shifts jobs; uproots populations; transforms institutions and
evaporates social conventions. As Karl Marx said of an earlier and milder phase
of international capitalism: ‘All that is solid melts into air’ (Marx and Engels,
1968: 38) Much of this is progressive, and not all that is swept away was so worth
keeping. However, there is a danger that this kind of ‘turbo-capitalism’ – as
Edward Luttwak (1999) has dubbed it – is also capable of devouring its own
foundations.
Max Weber famously argued that capitalism had essentially ethical roots in
the Protestant culture of northern Europe – it grew out of social bonds and val-
ues that existed prior to and quite independently of it. Today we talk of ‘social
capital’ – the networks, norms and relations of trust that facilitate collective
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action, under-girding societies and successful economies (Putnam, 1993). This
social capital, the deposit of centuries of social evolution – the by-product of a
different era – is arguably eroding under the pressure of globalisation. According
to Robert Putnam (2000) – scion of the social capital debate – this is most evi-
dent in the USA, the home of liberal globalist ideology and one of the countries
most at risk from economic polarisation and social fragmentation. However,
this is not only an American phenomenon. All countries caught up in the glob-
alisation process witness the weakening of social bonds. Increased mobility and
inequality slacken community ties and erode social capital.
Globalisation and education
So how has globalisation impacted on education? The answer must be funda-
mentally, but not in the ways that are often argued.
Globalisation itself has not yet substantially eroded national control over edu-
cation. It is true that supra-national bodies have increasing influence in some
areas. The OECD and World Bank have some impact, particularly on weaker
countries, through their relentless global marketing of favoured educational
policies, often backed by substantial financial clout. Within Europe, the
Commission is undoubtedly keen to extend its sphere of influence, not least in
its attempt to support the creation of a European knowledge economy through
lifelong learning. However, education still remains officially a matter of nation-
al competence, which few member states are willing to cede. The fact that the
Commission is obliged to advance its agenda through voluntary rather than reg-
ulatory means, through the so-called ‘open method of coordination’, only
underlines the point.
Governments still seek to manage their national systems – indeed, in some
ways, more actively than before with ever proliferating targets and audits. They
know that education remains one area where they still have some control. As
Robert Reich (1991) has pointed out, despite the waning of the ‘national econ-
omy’ and despite the internationalisation of most of the factors of production,
human skills remain relatively immobile and national. Governments increas-
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ingly see them as state resources to be deployed in the battle for competitive
advantage in the global market. They are not about to give up this prerogative.
Nor can they entirely ignore the need for the original Durkheimian function of
education in transmitting national cultures and promoting social cohesion. This
may be more difficult in modern pluralistic societies, where national and group
identities increasingly part company from what is left of the saliency of state-
hood and citizenship (Delanty, 2000). However, as the centrifugal forces of glob-
alisation relentlessly disrupt and fragment societies, governments simply cannot
afford to exempt education systems from their responsibilities for promoting
social cohesion. There are no other public agencies left which can do it (Green,
1997).
Nor are education systems all converging on a single model, despite the influ-
ence of transnational agencies and the proliferation of policy borrowing. New
global policy rhetorics – like lifelong learning – are certainly emerging, but in
practice they are interpreted and applied in quite different ways in different
places, as my earlier research with Alison Wolf and Tom Leney showed (Green,
Wolf and Leney, 1999). Education systems in Europe, for instance, vary consid-
erably in their degrees of centralisation and market penetration; their approach-
es to selection and early specialisation in secondary schooling; and their
dominant forms of upper secondary provision.
However, in certain key respects, globalisation does alter the prospects for tra-
ditional national education systems.
Most important is the impact of globalisation on the demand for skills and
qualifications. With increased global economic competition, advanced
economies can no longer compete with low-wage economies in cost-competi-
tive manufacturing and retain their living standards – hence the rush towards
the high value-added sectors which constitute the so-called knowledge econo-
my (Brown, Green and Lauder, 2001). There has been much hype about the
miraculous new virtual or ‘weightless’ economy. The new economy sectors never
provided that many jobs – the software industry in the US, for instance, still
employs less than a quarter of the number employed by General Motors – and
there was never a prospect of it shifting everyone into highly skilled, highly paid
work. Now, with the bursting of the IT bubble, Charles Leadbeater’s prescrip-
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tion (1999) for ‘Living on Thin Air’ seems rather foolish. However, it is still the
case that, on balance, work is becoming more skills intensive, and there is
increasing pressure on individuals to gain higher qualifications or risk margin-
alisation in the job market (Ashton et al., 1999). Hence the demand on govern-
ments to provide more learning opportunities intensifies.
However, governments are caught in a double bind here. As global economic
competition escalates demand for learning, so it diminishes government capac-
ity to meet that demand. Global market pressures force governments to keep
control of public spending to avoid uncompetitive tax levels which will deter
foreign investors and drive domestic firms and jobs abroad. The European
Union, following the same global market logic, reinforces the point through its
notorious ‘Growth and Stability Pact’ which obliges Member States to keep their
budgets deficits below 3 per cent of GDP. These dual effects – of rising demand
for skills and qualifications and diminished national state capacity to deliver
them – create an international market for education increasingly attractive to
private sector investors.
Higher education is to date the most internationalised and commercialised of
the educational sectors. As international demand for them rises, so university
research and teaching become internationally traded commodities offering
potentially rich returns to those institutions which compete best in the market.
Facilitated by new educational technologies, and supported by supra-national
bodies such as the European Commission, international higher education teach-
ing and research have grown exponentially and look set to continue to do so. In
most countries, up until now, this has involved mainly welcome additional rev-
enues for public sector institutions, but the potential for private sector involve-
ment is clear: even in 1999 the OECD estimated the value of trade in higher
education services at $30 billion. The US private sector has already cashed in on
this in a big way. Not only are many of the leading universities private business-
es, but there has been a huge growth in the commercialisation and corporate
branding of university life, so that most American campuses are festooned with
advertising logos and their faculties are stuffed with corporate chairs. Nike alone
have sponsorship deals with more than 200 campus athletics departments The
threat to academic independence from the gagging deals that often go with cor-
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porate sponsorship of research and entire campuses hardly needs emphasising.
The iniquitous ‘non-disparagement clause’ which went with Reebok’s sponsor-
ship of the University of Wisconsin is well known because students and faculty
campaigned against it, but there must be many less blatant cases which never
come to public attention (Klein, 2001).
School education is neither so internationalised nor so open to commercial
exploitation as higher education for obvious reasons. The majority of children
will not cross borders to go to school and internationalised virtual schooling is
not an option where child minding and socialisation remain primary purposes
of schooling for both parents and states. Nor have the profit opportunities
seemed good enough to date to attract major corporate investment into the
delivery of home student learning, although this is now growing. Edubusinesses
such as Edison and Tessaract in the US have not been notably successful in run-
ning public schools and school districts because they have found it difficult, not
surprisingly, to maintain standards and turn a profit at the standard levels of per
student funding (Fitz and Beers, 2002). In Britain, Education Action Zones have
received relatively little private sector investment and only a handful of failing
education authorities and schools have been taken over by for-profit business-
es. However, the number is growing. Tower Hamlets LEA has recently been
handed over to the trading wing of SERCO (Regan, 2002).
Creeping forms of privatisation are increasingly evident, particularly in
English-speaking countries. In the US Charter schools, less tied by regulations
and standards than the public schools, offer better opportunities for profitable
edubusiness, along with textbook and teaching aid production. The most
notable example of this, reaching over 8 million school students, is Channel
One’s TV broadcasts, which smuggle in advertising with current affairs pro-
gramming. In the UK the major form of privatisation to date has come with the
commercial contracting out of services such as school meals and cleaning, and
with the Private Finance Initiative, which involves private sector financing and
operating of public service facilitates that are rented back by the state. By
November 2000, there were 71 such education projects planned worth some
£680 million and involving 673 schools (Fitz and Beers, 2002). But there is also
increasing involvement of private companies like Nord Anglia in mainstream
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delivery activities such as curriculum development, school inspection and
school improvement.
Britain has been more active in the privatisation of services than most coun-
tries. Nevertheless, as Fitz and Beers conclude in their recent study, ‘the privati-
sation of public education … has so far moved at glacial speed’ (Fitz and Beers,
2002). However, one should not underestimate the commercial potential and
political temptation that may push in this direction. While the European Union
maintains the ‘Stability’ Pact’s punitive stance towards public spending,
European governments will be tempted to find ingenious ways to plug public
service gaps with private investment as the UK government does with the PFI,
which conveniently takes public investment off balance sheet. Equally, at a time
of dwindling capital investment opportunities, potentially lucrative markets in
services are increasingly attractive to investors and corporate pressure for the
opening up of these markets persists. International agencies are responding.
While the terms of WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) still
remain somewhat ambiguous in relation publicly provided services, there can
be no doubt that major interests lie behind the move to extend the internation-
al market in education provision.
Globalisation, then, does not reduce national interests in education, nor the
desire of governments to serve them. However, what it does do is raise the
demand for skills and qualifications whilst reducing state capacity to meet them.
The most ubiquitous national response to all this is, in fact, lifelong learning –
that most globalised and chameleon of educational discourses, which both
masks and legitimates multiple policy changes, including privatisation. As com-
petition and technological change drive up the employer demand for skills, and
as individuals increasingly compete for career-enhancing certificates, so gov-
ernments have to find new ways to meet the demand. Lifelong learning is an
ingenious solution, made possible in part by the new learning technologies. By
declaring learning a lifelong and ‘life wide’ process – occurring everywhere from
the school to the home, the workplace and the community – governments are
able both to respond to individual demands for more diverse learning opportu-
nities which mesh with their modern lifestyles, and to shift the costs, which they
can no longer bear, onto employers, individuals and their families and commu-
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nities (Green, 2000).
This, more than any other development, challenges the notion of the ‘educa-
tion system’. We have been used to thinking about education in terms of schools
and colleges and other institutions. In years to come these may well cease to be
the main locus of learning activity. To this extent the idea of the educational sys-
tem does become marginalised. We will have to start to think more about infor-
mal learning, workplace learning, and learning in the community and home
(Broadfoot, 2000).
Implications for comparative education
So what are the implications of globalisation for comparative education? One
conclusion we could draw is that cross-national comparison is now redundant.
Ulrich Beck has taken this view (Beck, 2000). Social science, he says, has for too
long been the creature of the nation state; since the founding fathers first treat-
ed society and state as co-extensive, the state has operated as a kind of ‘contain-
er’ of all concepts and data. Now, in an age of globalisation, says Beck, a
‘nationally based sociology is becoming obsolete’. The message is clear: social
science should abandon the ‘methodological nationalism’ of its intellectual past
rather as Marx claimed to cast off his ‘erstwhile philosophical conscience’ in
abandoning Hegel. The new mission should be to analyse world society and
transnational space.
This is a tall order for comparative education. Like social science in general,
and indeed probably more so, comparative education as a field has its origins in
national thinking. From Jullien, Levasseur and Sadler, through to Kandel, Hans,
Mallinson and King, comparative education has taken the national system as its
main object of enquiry and ‘national character’ as its main explanandum. This
exclusively national way of thinking is now surely outdated. Explaining educa-
tional structures and outcomes in terms of national character and culture was
always a somewhat essentialist exercise, in danger of reifying national culture as
some irreducible and homogenous property. Now, with growing social diversi-
ty, the glocalisation of culture and the creation of transnational cultural spaces,
18
Andy Green
this approach will surely not do. Comparativists should cease taking national
states as the only – or even main – units for comparison.
There is certainly a call for more studies of education and learning across sub-
national regions and communities: like the so-called ‘home international’ stud-
ies conducted by David Raffe and colleagues in Scotland, or Karen Evans’s
multi-layered comparisons of youth learning and transitions in matched cities
in different countries. Recent doctoral theses are using new approaches: for
instance Jack Keating’s multi-dimensional comparisons of regional differences
in upper secondary curricula within Australia and the UK (Keating, 1999).
Much more comparative work could be done in this area. In Belgium, for
instance, the language group forms the main basis for educational administra-
tion, and is thus a natural unit for comparing the combined effects of different
structures and cultures on outcomes. Likewise Switzerland, with its French-
speaking and German-speaking regions with different educational structures
and cultures, provides an ideal laboratory for comparative work.
There is also room for more studies across supra-national regions. Bob
Cowen’s work on ‘rims’ opens up a new perspective in regional comparison
(Cowen, 2000). Similarly, the work of David Ashton and colleagues on European
and East Asian skills formation systems (Ashton and Green, 1996; Ashton et al.,
1999) opens up the possibility of explicitly cross-regional analyses of skills for-
mation, drawing on the now burgeoning regional studies of political economy
(e.g. Albert, 1993; Berger and Dore, 1996; Dore, 2000; Hampden-Turner and
Trompenaars, 1993; Hutton, 1995; Streeck, 1997; Thurow, 1993). The High Skills
Project (Brown, Green and Lauder, 2001) set out to analyse ‘national routes to
the high skills economy,’ but like the earlier studies by Ashton et al. (1999) and
Crouch et al. (1999) found as much potential for comparison of regional and
sectoral differences. One can now imagine many more ambitious studies that
would take the supra-national region as the predominant unit. There is sub-
stantial evidence, after all, that education and skills formation systems do tend
to cluster along regional lines (Green, Wolf and Leney, 1999). If this is the case,
comparativists could learn a great deal about how contexts shape educational
change by studying how far pan-regional characteristics, net of the policy diffu-
sion effects between the countries within them, do in fact explain cross-region-
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al variations in systems characteristics.
Lastly, the salience of international cross-sectoral comparison also suggests
another important point regarding units of comparison. So long as the units
being compared have ‘societal’ characteristics (i.e. in terms of characteristic
institutional structures and rules) there is no reason for limiting comparison to
territorially defined units. Diasporic language groups, distributed communities
and ‘virtual communities’, are all – in theory at least – amenable to comparative
educational research.
This evident potential for comparison at different non-national levels does
not mean, however, that Beck is correct to argue that cross-national study is
obsolete. School systems, unlike some higher education systems, are still very
national institutions. Their structures and processes are shaped primarily by
national legislation and the national institutional and cultural contexts in which
they operate. To understand the structural (i.e. institutional and cultural) fac-
tors that determine their forms and outcomes may often require that we com-
pare across countries – especially where there is too little system variation within
countries to allow within-country comparison (Noah and Eckstein, 1969).
Nations are still the preferred units for comparative social science for good
reasons. Many of the data are still collected at national level. Many of the oper-
ative societal variables are measured as national level aggregates because they
proxy for structures and institutions – labour markets, industry structures,
political systems, cultural traits – which are still essentially national. Countries
do still vary regularly and substantially on a whole range of demographic, eco-
nomic and cultural indicators. As Ronald Inglehart tersely concludes from his
exhaustive study of data for 25 countries in the World Values Survey (1990) ‘The
peoples of different societies are characterized by enduring differences in basic
attitudes, values and skills: In other words they have different cultures’ (1990:
3). These cultures are not monolithic and nor are they immutable. However, in
given times and places they act as important determinants of social and politi-
cal behaviour which cannot be left out of account.
The country level, therefore, remains important for comparative analysis –
but it is only one of a number of levels at which comparison can be effectively
used. The question of units of comparison should not in any case be decided a
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priori, but rather according to research criteria. As Neil Smelser has argued, the
main criteria for choosing the unit of comparison should be that it is: (1) appro-
priate to the theoretical problem; (2) causally related to the phenomenon being
studied; (3) that there are data available at this level (Smelser, 1976). This allows
for comparison at various different levels, including multiple levels. The diffi-
culty is to make sure that where the level of observation differs from the level of
explanation false extrapolations are not made from the evidence at one level to
justify explanations at a different level – thus falling into the trap which econo-
mists call the ‘ecological fallacy’ (Smelser, 1976).
The main methodological challenge for comparative educationalists is not, in
any case, about levels of analysis; it is about the nature of comparative analysis
and whether to do it at all. Peter Jarvis’ question: ‘Why should we undertake
comparative analysis at all in this Global Village?’(Jarvis, 2000) may be not so
hard to answer.1 Globalisation, as argued above, is not so far removing differ-
ence from the world as to make comparison and contrast impossible. So long as
there are still contrasting societal units to compare, comparison is still possible.
Globalisation may alter the spacial dimensions of what we take to be a mean-
ingful societal unit, but even Beck would not argue that society has ceased to
exist, or that world society is irreducible.
The harder question to answer is what is comparative analysis? It can be
argued that all social science is essentially comparative. Durkheim famously
wrote that ‘comparative sociology is not a particular branch of sociology, it is
sociology itself, in so far as it ceases to be purely descriptive and aspires to
account for the facts’ (Smelser, 1976: 2). But for Durkheim accounting for the
facts meant understanding the pattern of relationships between collectivities –
or what he terms ‘social facts’ – since this is what distinguishes sociology from
other disciplines such as psychology. The study, statistical or otherwise, of vari-
ations in individual traits and behaviours is therefore, rightly in my view, not
generally considered to be comparative study, although it may share certain
objectives with it, as Smelser argues (1976). The difference, as Charles Ragin
lucidly argues, is meta-theoretical: comparativists believe that societies are ‘real’
phenomena; methodological individualists believe they are simply statistical
abstractions (Ragin, 1981).
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Collectivities, or societies, are, as Durkheim conceded, made up of individu-
als and their actions; but they represent more than the sum of those. The pat-
terns of variation between collective or societal properties and behaviours, and
the determining relationships between them, cannot be explained by the mere
aggregation of individual characteristics and actions. This requires analysis of
the effects of structures and characteristics which are integral to the collectivity
or society itself, and which have meaning only at that level. Many societal char-
acteristics cannot be considered, for instance, in individual level statistical analy-
sis, either because they only show up as constants and cannot therefore be used
to explain variation, or because they are meaningless at that level. Distributional
properties, for instance, such as income or skills spread have no meaning at the
level of the individual (Green and Preston, 2002 forthcoming). Comparative
research is thus about analysing the pattern of relationship between character-
istics of societal or collective entities, whether they be at national or other lev-
els.
There are, of course, many ways of using comparative methods to understand
relationships of cause and effect. John Stuart Mill famously wrote about the
Method of Agreement, the Method of Difference, and the Indirect Method,
which is a combination of the two (Mill, 1970). All methods of comparison in
social science, whether quantitative or qualitative, are, in a sense, variations on
this theme, although it is rarely possible to meet Mill’s ideal requirements that
all possibly operative variables are considered, because we cannot know in
advance what they all are. Comparison works by the manipulation of variables,
holding certain variables constant, so as to test the independent effects of other
observed variables on outcomes (Smelser, 1976).
Quantitative comparison does this statistically, establishing probabilistic rela-
tionships between independent and dependent variables, and has the advantage
that it can simultaneously test correlations amongst a large number of variables.
However, quantitative analysis faces major limitations in cross-societal compar-
ison. There are often insufficient data for many of the societal units that might
be studied, thus reducing the number of possible cases in the sample to a point
where there are more variables than there are cases. This makes statistical analy-
sis unreliable. Statisticians may respond by widening the sample to a very dis-
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parate range of countries or units, to achieve sufficient cases, but this introduces
new problems about comparing societies that are essentially incomparable
except at meaningless levels of abstraction. Statistical comparison across socie-
tal units is sometimes possible, but often cannot take you very far.
If comparative analysis is defined as comparing across societal entities, as
argued here, then Charles Ragin is probably right to argue that the characteris-
tic method must be that of qualitative comparison, or what he calls the ‘com-
parative logical method’ (Ragin, 1981). This method does not work with
samples or populations but with all relevant instances of the phenomenon in
question, or with a set of these cases that the researcher decides are relevant, and
which will set the limits of generalisation for the explanation. Consequently,
there is no temptation to compare large samples of dissimilar cases where the
number of variables is so wide as to defy analysis. The logical method has a num-
ber of other advantages. First, whereas statistical analysis finds it hard to deal
with multiple causation, logical comparative analysis tends to work with con-
figurations of conditions. The logical method requires explanation of all cases
under consideration. A number of valid sets of preconditions for the outcome
of interest can be identified, whereas statistical analysis will only tend to bring
out the most dominant (Ragin, 1981). Second, whereas statisticians only exam-
ine the relationship between specific variables, logical comparative analysis
examines cases holistically and in their ‘real’ context. Qualitative analysis can
therefore pay more attention to the actual mechanisms of causation, whereas
statistical analysis alone cannot go beyond determining the probable strength
and direction of causation. Logical comparative analysis cannot, of course, claim
that its findings can be generalised beyond the cases under review, but in avoid-
ing the universalising tendencies of statistical approaches, it tends to respect the
unities of time and place which are, arguably, essential to any credible historical
or sociological analysis.
Logical comparative analysis can be conducted in a number of different ways
and for different purposes. In their very illuminating article on comparative his-
torical sociology, for instance, Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers distinguish
between three primary types of comparative ‘logics-in-use’ (Skocpol and
Somers, 1980). The first type, described as ‘parallel demonstration of theory’
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and exemplified by Perry Anderson’s Lineages of the Absolutist State (1974),
involves using comparison to illustrate the application of previously derived
theories in different historical cases. The process of applying the theory to given
cases may enrich and refine the theory, and may demonstrate the explanatory
power of the theory, but comparison is not used here either to generate or vali-
date the hypotheses. In the second type of ‘contrast-oriented comparison’, exem-
plified by Reinhard Bendix’s Nation-Building and Citizenship (1977), what
matters most is that the historical integrity of each case is respected.
Comparison is used to demonstrate the variety and particularity of historical
conditions, thus throwing into relief the essential characteristics of each unique
case. Theorising tends not to be as explicit as in the ‘parallel’ type, and compar-
ison is not generally used to generate the explanations, which are usually derived
at the level of each case, although within a common comparative frame of ref-
erence.
The third type of comparison is described as ‘macro-causal analysis’ and it is
here, and only here, where systematic controlled comparison is used to generate
and test hypotheses and explanations of cause and effects relationships. This, as
Skocpol and Somers rightly argue, represents the most powerful form of com-
parative analysis and can involve works of huge complexity and power, such as
Barrington Moore’s magisterial Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship
(1966). The difficulty with such works lies in maintaining an analytically driv-
en discourse, which moves constantly between positive and negative cases,
whilst also maintaining sufficient narrative detail about time and place so that
the sense of historical period is not lost. Historians and historical sociologists
will often disagree about the point at which such theorising moves beyond the
genuinely ‘historical’.
The methods of logical comparison which address cause and effect relation-
ships are mostly variations on the ‘indirect method’, which Mill thought pecu-
liarly suitable for phenomena that have multiple causation (Mill, 1970).
Basically, the investigator examines multiple instances where a particular phe-
nomenon occurs, noting whatever conditions they have in common, and com-
pares these with a range of instances where the phenomenon does not occur. If
certain conditions are common to the first set and are absent in the second set,
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and if the cases are otherwise similar, you can assume that these conditions rep-
resent causes of the phenomenon in question in these cases. The method is
always open to the accusation that there are ‘third causes’ which it has failed to
observe, but this can be the case also, although it is less likely, in quantitative
analysis, where a correlation may be due to an unobserved variable which affects
both of the correlated variables simultaneously. Neither of the methods can
determine for sure what is cause and what is effect, although quantitative meth-
ods have more chances of doing this where there is a longitudinal element and
qualitative methods where there is some examination of the causal process. Only
natural experiments and randomised controlled trials, with controlled samples
and time frames, can escape these flaws, but even there social scientists may fail
to understand what attribute of the intervention is having a given effect.
Macro-causal comparative analysis is, therefore, one – uniquely powerful –
form of comparative analysis amongst several others valid forms, all of which
aspire broadly to explanation. In relation, then, to comparative education we
may broadly agree with Jurgen Shriewer’s contention that ‘as a social scientific
method, comparison does not consist in relating observable facts but in relating
relationships or even patterns of relationship to each other’ (Shriewer and
Holmes, 1988). In order to warrant claims to comparative method, comparative
education must go beyond classification and parallel description of cases. This
may optimally be done through macro-analysis of causal relationships, but it
may also involve ‘contrastive’ and ‘parallel’ methods, where these are at least
seeking to confront theoretical propositions with empirical observation.
The problem with contemporary comparative education research is that
much – or even most – of it is not actually comparative in any of the above sens-
es. This is well illustrated by Angela Little’s recent survey of articles published in
Comparative Education between 1977 and 1988, which shows that over 50 per
cent have been single country studies. Some of these may be what Leach and
Preston call ‘comparisons in a single nation’ but Little concludes that ‘only a
small percentage [of articles] have adopted an explicitly comparative approach’
(Little, 2000: 285). Probably the vast majority of published studies in compara-
tive education generally are either non-comparative analyses of single countries
or parallel descriptions of education practices and policies across a group of
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countries (which would fall into Hopkins’ and Wallerstein’s category of multi-
national studies: 1970). Whatever the merits of these types of study, and they
may be great, neither necessarily uses comparative methods to analyse or test
hypotheses about cause and effect relationships, or even to confront theory and
evidence comparatively to produce what Weber called ‘understanding’.
We may believe, as I do, that it is not helpful to police disciplinary frontiers or
to draw sharp lines around field of study. But any field or discipline needs some
core and distinguishing methodological criteria. In comparative education, and
indeed any field of comparative research, these must include the use of com-
parison to further explanation or to test claims about cause and effect relation-
ships. In the absence of natural experiments in social science, the comparative
method is the next best thing to scientific ‘proof ’ and comparative education as
a field would lose much credibility as a rigorous academic pursuit if it did not
use this systematically.
Comparative education needs to compare, and to do this systematically, if it is
avoid the accusation that it too often degenerates into a catalogue of travellers’
tales, policy advocacy and opportunistic rationalisations of unscientific policy-
borrowing. One way that it can do this is to draw more on the mainstream of
comparative history and social science research for its concepts, methodology
and evidence. But it is striking, when you revisit the central texts of the com-
parative education canon, how removed comparative education has been from
some of the main currents in comparative history and social science. It is hard
not to conclude that comparative education has been at times somewhat insu-
lar; sometimes too preoccupied with self-referential internal debates, including
those perennials about the limits of policy borrowing and the boundaries of
comparative and international approaches. We would do well to take more
account of relevant comparative work in cognate fields, as well as to remember
the important work in comparative education carried out by ‘unbaptised’ com-
parativists who do not go to comparative conferences and who do not see them-
selves as professional comparative educationalists (Alexander, 2001). Opening
up comparative education in the twenty-first century should mean embracing
all those who use comparative methods and whose work can help in under-
standing educational problems.
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Comparative analysis remains the most powerful tool for (causal) explana-
tion of societal aspects of the educational process. Globalisation does not reduce
its usefulness, although in creating educational spaces which belong exclusively
to neither nations nor systems, it makes us look to broadening our units of
analysis. The major challenges posed for comparative education today, as ever
before, are essentially twofold. The first is to make the field genuinely compara-
tive. The second is to bring it back from its relative isolation into the mainstream
of comparative social science/historical sociology where it rightly belongs. The
enormous richness of the current social science debate around globalisation
should at least help to make the second challenge attractive.
Note
1 See also: R. Dale, (200) ‘Globalisation and Education: Demonstrating a
‘Common World Educational Culture’’ or Locating a ‘Globally Structured
Educational Agenda?’ Educational Theory, 50 (4): 427–48.
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